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1. Introduction
Th e Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), nowadays known as ‘the Union 
for the Mediterranean’ (UfM), celebrates this year its fi fteenth anniversary. Fol-
lowing the geopolitical turbulence of the fall of the iron curtain, the EMP was 
created in 1995 to enhance the relations between the European Union (EU) and 
the Mediterranean Non-Community Countries (MNCs).1 It consists of three 
baskets: a political and security partnership, an economic and fi nancial partner-
ship and a partnership in social, human and cultural aff airs. Th e overall objective 
of the economic and fi nancial partnership is the creation of an ‘area of shared 
prosperity’ through ‘the stimulation of the socio-economic development of the 
MNCs, the improvement of the living conditions of Mediterranean people and 
through regional integration and cooperation’. With this aim, both the EU and 
the Mediterranean partners agreed to establish a comprehensive and deep Euro-
Mediterranean Free Trade Area (EMFTA) by 2010.2 Th e European Neighbour-
1. Crawford, B., 2004, Why the Euro-Med Partnership? European Union Strategies in the Mediterranean Re-
gion. In: Aggarwal, V.K., Fogarty, E.A. (eds.), EU Trade Strategies: Between Regionalism and Globalism, Hound-
mills: Palgrave Macmillan.
2. Euro-Mediterranean Conference, 1995, Barcelona Declaration, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/external_re-
lations/euromed/docs/bd_en.pdf.
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hood Policy (ENP), created in 2003, even goes one step further and wants to 
grant the neighbouring countries ‘a stake in the internal market’.3 Despite these 
intentions, the ambitious objective of an EMFTA will not be met this year due to 
various obstacles on both the side of the EU and the MNCs.4
In that respect, this article has two core objectives. First, an overview of the 
initiatives that have been taken so far in order to reach the establishment of an 
EMFTA will be discussed and compared with the objectives set in 1995 in the 
next section. Finding that there is a considerable delay in the initiatives regarding 
the EMFTA, the second objective of this article is to analyze the underlying rea-
sons for this delay. We will especially focus on the political determinants for the 
lack of progress, supplementary to the already extensive literature on economic 
causes. In section 3.1, we will elaborate on diffi  culties at European side, high-
lighting the discussions regarding the EMFTA between the European member 
states and between the European Commission, the Council and the Parliament. 
Next, this article investigates the relationship between the EU and the MNCs in 
section 3.2, while in 3.3 we elaborate on the political problems between MNCs 
that impede the development of intraregional trade in the region, a prerequisite 
for the establishment of a fully-fl edged EMFTA. At last, the infl uence of other 
international actors in the Mediterranean area, which stimulates real competition 
between them and the EU, is discussed in section 3.4. We conclude by off er-
ing suggestions to overcome the identifi ed obstacles for the completion of a full 
EMFTA and to establish an inter-regional partnership.
2. An evaluation of the EMFTA anno 2010
Th e last fi fteen years, some important research has been conducted on the 
EMFTA and on the question how we can evaluate the development of a free trade 
area. Several studies have focused on so-called ‘outcome’ indicators, and looked 
at the evolution of trade between the EU and MNCs or trade among MNCs. 
Th ese studies generally found that trade between the EU and the Mediterranean 
region became less restrictive5, resulting in more trade between both regions6 but 
that trade among MNCs stays rather limited.7 However, it is rather diffi  cult to 
evaluate the impact of the EU through the EMP/ENP on this evolution in trade, 
3. European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy: Strategy Paper, COM (2004) 373, p. 14.
4. 8th Union for the Mediterranean trade ministerial conference, 2009, Conclusions, available at: http://
ec.europa.eu/external_relations/euromed/conf/conclusions_trade_ministerial_en.pdf
5. Hoekman, B., 2007, Regionalism and development: the European Neighbourhood Policy and integration à 
la carte, Journal of International Trade and Diplomacy, 1, 1, p. 7.
6. Gandara, P., Büge, M., Th e European Union’s trade policy towards the Southern Mediterranean: coherence 
or chaos?, Go-Euromed Working Paper, 6, 1, p. 6.
7. El-Rayyes, T., 2007, Trade and Regional Integration between Mediterranean partner countries, Go-Euromed 
Working Paper, 8, 10.
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as also the agreements in the WTO, reforms in the MNCs and international 
and endogenous economic factors played an important role here.8 Other studies 
were mostly interested in the impact of the EU’s measures regarding trade on the 
economies of MNCs, like for example the sustainability impact assessment (SIA) 
the European Commission itself ordered. Th is study found that both in the EU 
as in the Mediterranean, a rise of economic welfare due to the establishment of 
the EMFTA can be expected, but that there might be negative social and environ-
mental impacts if no additional measures are taken, like an increase in unemploy-
ment.9 Contrary to these studies that mainly deal with the outcome and impact 
of the EMFTA and therefore focus on economic factors, this article will examine 
the political causes of the slow pace in the establishment of the EMFTA. Th ere-
fore, the objectives set in 1995 will be compared with the actual achievements, 
and the focus will be on ‘output’ indicators, i.e. the free trade arrangements in 
place at the moment.
As outlined by the Barcelona Declaration, the objective of a deep and com-
prehensive EMFTA was to be reached gradually.10 We identify three steps in this 
process, which are not necessarily sequential but can be pursued simultaneously. 
First, the conclusion of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) between the EU 
and individual MNCs was projected, covering tariff  and non-tariff  barriers to 
trade in manufactured products and progressively liberalizing agricultural prod-
ucts and services with due regard to multilateral trade negotiations. Second, re-
gional trade cooperation was envisaged through the conclusion of FTAs among 
MNCs. Th e Barcelona Declaration did not specify explicitly how these bilateral 
agreements would then lead to a Free Trade Area. However, it emphasized the im-
portance of rules of origin and of other non-tariff  barriers as technical standards, 
intellectual property rights and competition as an implicit important third step to 
complete the EMFTA.11 In this section, we will glance through these three steps 
and evaluate the progress made.
Following12 the Barcelona Declaration, Euro-Mediterranean Association 
Agreements (EMAAs) have been signed and entered into force with Tunisia 
(1995; 1998), Israel (1995; 2000), Morocco (1996; 2000), Palestinian Authority 
(1997; 1997), Jordan (1997; 2002), Egypt (2001; 2004), Lebanon (2002; 2003) 
and Algeria (2002; 2005). With Syria, the agreement was initialled in 2004. At 
that time, the Council of the EU however refused to sign the agreement due to 
8. Hoekman, 2007, p. 7.
9. SIA-EMFTA Consortium, 2007, Sustainability Impact Assessment of the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade 
Area, Final Report, pp. 15–16
10. Euro-Mediterranean Conference, p. 4.
11. Euro-Mediterranean Conference, p. 5.
12. In the case of Tunisia and Israel: preceding.
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the diffi  cult political situation in the country. In 2009, relations between Syria 
and especially France were restored after diplomatic eff orts of Syria to get out of 
its international isolation. Following the opening-up of the relations, the Swedish 
presidency invited Syria in October 2009 to sign the in 2004 negotiated associa-
tion agreement, an off er the country refused as it wanted more time to examine 
the potential impact of the agreement on its economy.13 Also with Libya, there 
are no contractual relations for the moment, a consequence of the sanctions the 
EU put in place in 1999. In 2004, sanctions were lifted, and the EU started talks 
with the country to enhance the relations. Negotiations for the conclusion of a 
framework agreement started in November 2008 and are still going on.14
Th e articles of the original EMAAs provided market access for all industrial 
products, but were still limited regarding access for agricultural products. Th ere 
was a commitment towards progressive liberalisation, but initially tariff s and con-
tingent protection remained applicable and were listed in a protocol annexed to 
the agreement.15 Similarly, the agreements contained a commitment to liberalisa-
tion of trade in services and the right of establishment, but no specifi c arrange-
ments were made, except for Lebanon and Algeria (see infra). Furthermore, the 
agreements state that the implementation of EU competition and state rules are 
to be decided by the association council and there are no binding disciplines on 
government procurement liberalization.16 In general, we can state that, despite 
the ambitions of the Barcelona Declaration, the arrangements as written in the 
association agreements are rather limited and mainly cover trade in industrial 
goods. However, in recent years, there has been made some important progress 
on trade relations.
Regarding trade in industrial products, the provisions on custom duties have 
been fully implemented in case of Tunisia. Also Morocco and Israel have entered 
the last phase of their liberalization process in industrial goods. However, non-
tariff  barriers (NTBs) remain a major problem. To tackle these NTBs, the EU 
now wants to conclude Agreements on Conformity Assessment and Accredita-
tion (ACAAs) with MNCs and to establish dispute settlement mechanisms for 
the trade provisions in the EMAAs.17 Regarding the former, there is an agreement 
with Israel in the pharmaceutical sector, and regarding the latter, negotiations 
13. Agence Europe, 20 October 2009, p. 6.
14. Agence Europe, 12 November 2008, p. 7. and European Commission, 2010, Overview of FTA and other 
trade negotiations, available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf
15. See e.g.: Euro-Mediterranean Agreement, establishing an Association between the European Communities 
and their Member States, of the one part, and the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, of the other part, 
Offi  cial Journal of the European Communities, 10.10.2005, L265.
16. Hoekman, 2007, p. 6.
17. Lannon, E., 2008, Towards a Union for the Mediterranean: progress and challenges in economic and trade 
relations, Briefi ng paper for European Parliament’s Committee on International Trade, pp. 3–7.
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are already initialled with Jordan (2009), Lebanon (2009), Morocco (2009) and 
Tunisia (2008).18
In 2005, the Council decided to open the negotiations on the liberalization 
of agricultural products with MNCs. Th e developments at the international level 
stimulated this consideration of more far-reaching opening of market access at 
European side. During the Uruguay (1986-1994) and Doha (2001-ongoing) 
Round of WTO negotiations, the EU already had to make some important con-
cessions regarding agricultural trade. In anticipation of a further increase in im-
port of agricultural products from third countries, the EU reformed its Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 2003 and 2004. Th is also enabled the EU to make 
some important concessions regarding free trade in agricultural products with 
MNCs.19 Moreover, due to the developments at the international level and with-
out additional market access commitments by the EU, MNCs like Morocco and 
Tunisia would be faced with loss of preferential agricultural access to the EU mar-
ket, a phenomenon called ‘preference erosion’.20 As a consequence, agreements on 
the liberalization of agricultural products have already been closed with Egypt, 
Jordan and Israel. Negotiations are ongoing with Morocco and Tunisia, but ad-
vance with diffi  culty. Although both countries are in favour of greater market 
access to the EU, they fear the consequences for their own economies of gradually 
opening their agricultural markets for EU products21. Th e agreements already in 
place foresee the abolishing of custom duties to agricultural products listed in the 
protocols that are traded between the MNCs and the EU.
Regarding trade in services, the Council decided also in 2005 to open negotia-
tions on the liberalization of trade in services and right of establishment with the 
MNCs. Negotiations were launched with Egypt, Israel, Morocco and Tunisia, 
and are expected to be concluded in 2010.22 While the liberalization of trade in 
services could bring substantial gains for MNCs without the loss of government 
revenues associated with tariff  liberalization for industrial goods, agreement is 
hampered by the divergent interests of the EU and the MNCs and the complex 
regulatory reforms such liberalization entails. While the EU has a comparative 
advantage in modes 1 (cross-border supply) and 3 (commercial presence) the 
MNCs have interests in liberalization of modes 2 (consumption abroad) and 4 
18. European Commission, 2010, Overview of FTA and other trade negotiations, available at: http://trade.
ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/december/tradoc_118238.pdf
19. Galduf, J., 2005, Th e Application of the CAP Reform and its Repercussions in the Mediterranean Region, 
Mediterranean Yearbook 2005, pp. 154–157.
20. Escribao, G., 2006, Multilateral Trade Negotiations and Euro-Mediterranean Trade, Mediterranean Year-
book 2006, pp. 169–171.
21. Hervieu, B., 2007, At the heart of the Euro-Mediterranean challenge: Th e Agriculture and Food Issue, 
Mediterranean Yearbook, pp. 206–210.
22. 8th Union for the Mediterranean Trade Ministerial Conference, 2009, Conclusions, available at: http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/december/tradoc_145575.pdf
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(presence of natural persons). Th e European member states are reticent to make 
concessions on mode 4, which discourages the MNCs to grant right of establish-
ment for service providers to European companies.23 However, in the EMAAs 
with Algeria and Jordan, commitments regarding the movement of key personnel 
(mode 4) as well as commercial presence (mode 3) are included, indicating that 
such trade-off s are possible (see infra).24
Th e second pillar of the EMFTA is the promotion of the conclusion of FTAs 
among MNCs. Regional integration between MNCs is important to limit the 
so-called potential ‘hub-and-spoke eff ect’ of the conclusion of EMAAs: the risk 
that investors will choose to invest in the EU (the hub) and then export to the 
Arab countries (the spokes), leading to few foreign direct investments (FDIs) in 
the Mediterranean necessary for its economic development.25 It has proven to 
be rather diffi  cult to stimulate FTAs among the MNCs, notwithstanding some 
important initiatives. In 1997, eighteen Arab countries (including the Gulf coun-
tries) signed the agreement establishing a Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA). 
As a reaction to this faltering process and spurred on by the EU, Egypt, Jordan, 
Morocco and Tunisia signed in 2004 the Agadir Agreement for the Establish-
ment of a Free Trade Zone between the Arabic Mediterranean Nations, that is 
open to other countries in the region which have an Association Agreement with 
the EU.26 Th e Agadir Agreement covers trade in industrial goods, agricultural 
products and services. However, the initialization of the agreement had to be 
postponed until 2007 because certain provisions on agriculture confl icted with 
the US-Morocco FTA. An important aspect of the Agadir Agreement is that it 
applies EU rules of origin (see infra). Furthermore, bilateral FTAs are in place 
between Israel and Jordan and between Turkey and Egypt, Israel, Morocco, the 
Palestinian Territories, Syria and Tunisia.
Th is far from complete regional economic integration among the MNCs nat-
urally prevents the regionalization of the FTAs, which we identifi ed as the third 
and fi nal step towards an EMFTA. However, in expectation of FTAs connecting 
(all or more) MNCs, steps have already been taken that should facilitate the 
free movement of goods in the entire EMFTA by the establishment of a system 
of Pan-Euro-Mediterranean cumulation of origin.27 Th is proposal has been ap-
23. Th e right of establishment is not mentioned in the Istanbul Framework Protocol, the basis for negotiations 
regarding trade in services and the right of establishment.
24. Hoekman, B., Özden, C., 2009, Th e Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Trade in Services as an Alternative 
to Migration? World Bank Policy Research Paper, 5049.
25. Hoekman, B. and J. Zarrouk (eds.), 2000, Catching up with competition: trade opportunities and chal-
lenges for Arab countries, p. 286.
26. Wippel, S., 2005, Th e Agadir Agreement and Open Regionalism, EuroMeSCo paper, 45.
27. Th is means that products which have obtained originating status in one of the 42 countries may be added 
to products originating in any other one of the 42 countries without losing their originating status within the 
Pan-Euro-Med zone. However, this diagonal cumulation is conditional: countries of the zone can only cumulate 
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proved by the Council on 11 October 2005 and is currently being implemented. 
It is applied to the four members of the Agadir Agreement and Israel.28
Overall, we can state that the pace and scope of the progress towards the 
establishment of the EMFTA has been disappointing by not realizing fully the 
objective of a fully-fl edged free trade area set in 1995. Although the last fi ve years 
some important decisions have been taken at European side, e.g. the opening of 
negotiations in agricultural products and services, there are still some important 
obstacles to be overcome regarding these sectors. Besides incomplete liberaliza-
tion between the EU and the MNCs, also regional integration among the MNCs 
leaves much to be desired. Th is led the European Parliament rightly to conclude 
that the Free Trade Area is ‘far from being attainted’29 and the Union for the 
Mediterranean Trade Ministerial Conference to adopt a ‘Euromed Trade Road-
map beyond 2010’. In the following sections, we will try to explain the observed 
slow pace of progress and major obstacles in reaching a full-fl edged EMFTA.
3. Explanations for the slow and incomplete establishment of EMFTA
3.1. Th e EU as an internally confl icted and compartmentalized trade persona
A fi rst element that contributed to the diffi  culties in installing a deep and 
comprehensive EMFTA are the diff erent positions of the European actors re-
garding the idea and the modalities of an EMFTA with the Mediterranean re-
gion. Before negotiating with third countries, there has to be found an internal 
agreement on the EU’s negotiating position between the European institutions 
(mainly the Commission and the Council) and between the member states. But 
the European institutions have diff erent positions on the EMFTA due to their 
diff erent competences, and the member states have diff erent preferences regard-
ing free trade due to their diff erent internal economic and political situations. As 
a consequence, the EU’s multilevel governance structure and its nature of being 
an internally confl icted30 and compartmentalized31 trade persona often hampered 
the European actors in fi nding a common position regarding concessions to be 
made to MNCs on the road towards a full and comprehensive EMFTA, as the 
following paragraphs will illustrate.
originating status if they have free trade agreements between them (see http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/
customs/customs_duties/rules_origin/preferential/article_783_en.htm).
28. Lannon, E., Martin, I., 2009, Report on the Status and Progress of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: 
Survey of Experts and Actors on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Barcelona, IEMed, p. 18.
29. Agence Europe, 27 November 2009, p. 1.
30. Meunier, S., Nicolaïdis, K., 2006, Th e European Union as a Confl icted Trade Power, Journal of European 
Public Policy, 13, 6, pp. 906–925.
31. Pilegaard, J., 2009, ... and Never the Twain Shall Meet? An Institutionalist Perspective of EU Trade and 
Developmental Policies in the Context of the EPA Negotiations. In: Faber, G., Orbie, J. (eds.), Beyond Market 
Access for Economic Development: EU-Africa Relations in Transition, London, Routledge.
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Although the idea of the gradual establishment of an EMFTA was already 
discussed in the seventies in the context of the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreements (PCAs), the idea was laid back on the European table by Morocco 
in 1992. Th is idea was welcomed by the European Commission, and by Spain, 
which hoped that the instalment of the EMFTA would unblock the negotiations 
on the EEC-Moroccan fi sheries agreement, an agreement by which Spanish fi sh-
ermen would have access to Moroccan fi shery grounds. However, the European 
Parliament was initially not in favour of the free trade area. Because it had no 
formal competence regarding FTAs, the agreement would diminish its infl uence 
in European-Moroccan relations. Nevertheless, the European Council agreed in 
principle with the idea of the gradual installation of a free trade area between the 
European Community and all Maghreb countries, although not all European 
member states were in favour of explicitly stating the objective of a free trade area 
in the declaration.32 Only, later on, with the launch of the Barcelona Process in 
1995, all European actors agreed that the establishment of an EMFTA would be 
one of the most important objectives in Euro-Mediterranean relations.
Also the discussions within and between European institutions regarding the 
modalities of the EMFTA proved to be rather diffi  cult, especially with regard to 
trade in agricultural products and the free movement of persons. First of all, re-
garding trade in agricultural products, there was an important cleavage noticeable 
within the Commission in the nineties, where the Commissioner for external 
relations with the Mediterranean was willing to make some important conces-
sions regarding trade in agricultural products. However, he met with resistance 
from the Commissioner for agriculture, who planned a reform of the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) and considered that the time was not yet ripe to make 
already concessions towards third countries. Both commissioners often cut clean 
across each other, although they always managed to fi nd a compromise.33 Th is 
compromise had then to be approved by the member states. Regarding agricul-
tural products, there were discussions with the southern member states, that were 
under the pressure of farm lobbies to protect their agricultural products mar-
kets. As the southern member states were rather reticent regarding market access, 
they suggested to compensate the Mediterranean neighbours by providing them 
a larger amount of fi nancial assistance. Th is caused discussion with the north-
ern member states like Germany, which were concerned about the cost that this 
would bring for the European budget, especially because they were net contribu-
tors to the budget.34
32. Agence Europe, 28 Juin 1992, pp. 15–16
33. For an example, see Agence Europe, 17 Juin 1993, p. 14.
34. Del Sarto, R. and T. Schumacher, From EMP to ENP: What’s at stake with the European Neighbourhood 
Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean?, European Foreign Aff airs Review, 10, 32.
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During all negotiations with MNCs on agricultural products, the Commis-
sion was confronted with the resistance from Southern member states. However, 
due to its unique position of negotiator in trade issues, the European Commis-
sion has some important power in deciding on European concessions and deals it 
can arrange. In negotiations on the FTAs with the Mediterranean, the Commis-
sion did not doubt to use this power against the member states (as well as against 
third countries). As a consequence, tensions arose between the Commission and 
the Council about the distribution of their competences. Th e latter accused the 
Commission of going beyond its negotiating mandate, and one member state 
even wanted to intervene in the negotiations with the MNCs. Th is made the 
discussions highly politicized, and caused delays in the negotiations.35 Due to 
the developments at the international level and the reform of the CAP (see su-
pra), the positions of the European actors regarding trade in agricultural products 
eventually merged, although the North-South cleavage between the Northern 
and the Southern member states regarding the modalities of the concessions 
stayed in place.
Second, there were similar cleavages noticeable in the positions of the Eu-
ropean actors regarding the temporary movement of natural persons providing 
services (GATS mode 4), the presence of natural persons. Th e European Com-
mission is prepared to make concessions towards MNCs in this domain. With 
the launch of the ENP in 2003, it even proposed to extend the limited provi-
sions for workers to free movement for all persons from neighbouring countries.36 
However, the problems of the EU to make concessions on mode 4 relate to the 
sensitivity of the member states towards labour market opening and immigra-
tion. Especially the southern member states are reticent, as they would be the fi rst 
to be confronted with workers and migrants from the Mediterranean. And while 
the authority to negotiate on the liberalization of trade in goods and services lies 
with the European Commission, migration is the reserved domain of the mem-
ber states, enabling them to veto any agreement on the free movement of persons. 
Th is shows that the European actors were and still are divided on some important 
modalities of the EMFTA.
3.2. Th e relationship between the EU and the MNCs
An important consequence of the EU’s internally confl icted and compart-
mentalized nature as a trade persona is the lack of incentives the EU can off er to-
wards MNCs. After a diffi  cult internal European compromise has been agreed, it 
is almost impossible to deviate from this position during negotiations with third 
35. Gomez, R., 2003, Evaluating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Aldershot, Ashgate, p. 59.
36. European Commission, Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our East-
ern and Southern Neighbours, COM (2003) 104, p. 10.
EEF 356.indb   201 04/08/10   15:49
Ferdi De Ville & Vicky Reynaert202
L’Europe en formation   nº 356   été 2010
countries. Although most MNCs are strong advocates of further liberalization of 
trade in agricultural products and free movement of persons, they often do not 
have considerable bargaining power to provoke concessions from the EU. Coun-
tries like Morocco and Tunisia export almost 80% of their products to the EU, 
meaning that the EU is their most important trading partner, while the Mediter-
ranean as a region is only the fi fth trading partner of the EU.37 Th is dependency 
is intensifi ed by the fact that the MNCs do not succeed in reaching a common 
bargaining position due to mutual problems (see 3.3). Also the institutional in-
frastructure of the EMP made it rather diffi  cult for the MNCs to act as one bloc 
towards the EU.38 As argued by Gomez and as shown above, most concessions 
made by the EU are therefore mainly the consequence of factors outside the Bar-
celona Process, rather than an admission to Mediterranean demands.39
Nevertheless, some Mediterranean partners, and then especially Algeria and 
Syria do have a considerable amount of bargaining power in their relations with 
the EU due to their status as energy producers. Algeria and Syria can play an 
important role in the diversifi cation strategy of the EU to diminish the gas de-
pendency of Russia. Moreover, Algeria is also an important partner for the EU in 
the fi ght against illegal immigration and terrorism. Especially Algeria is willing 
to use this bargaining power to provoke more concessions from European side, 
particularly regarding the association agreement and free movement of persons. 
Although Algeria signed an association agreement with the EU that came into 
force in September 2005, its general feeling is that the agreement until now only 
had negative consequences for the country. Th e country felt especially disap-
pointed about the commitments made on European side. Moreover, the minister 
for trade also stated its disappointment about the lack of support of the EU on 
the eff orts of Algeria to join the WTO. Th erefore, it asked the review of the cur-
rent association agreement.40 Similarly, also the Syrian government expressed its 
doubts about the advantages of the future association agreement with the EU. It 
delayed the signature of the agreement until it has more clarity about the eff ects 
on its economy.41 Th is shows that the EU has problems convincing some of its 
most important trading partners about the potential benefi ts of the EMAA and 
the EMFTA.
37. Bouzeran, A., 2007, Th e European Union and its ten Mediterranean partner countries: growing trading 
links. Luxembourg, Offi  cial Publication of the European Communities, pp. 4–6.
38. Furness, M., Gandara, P. And A. Kern, Th e Political Economy of Euro-Mediterranean Governance, Report 
for GO-EuroMed Brussels Conference, 27-28 November 2008, p. 12.
39. Gomez, R., 2003, Evaluating the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Aldershot, Ashgate, p. 60.
40. Agence Europe, 3 February 2010, p. 6.
41. Agence Europe, 20 October 2009, p. 6.
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3.3. Diff erences among the MNCs
Another important prerequisite for the establishment of a full EMFTA, is 
the conclusion of FTAs among the MNCs. However, until now, the EMP and 
the commercial negotiations in particular have witnessed a hub-and-spoke re-
lationship dominated by the EU (see supra). Th e MNCs have not succeeded 
in integrating their economies. Th eir intraregional trade still stands at very low, 
prohibitive levels. Th is frightens off  international investors. As a consequence, 
MNCs still hold a very low share of global FDIs, although FDIs are considered as 
necessary to stimulate economic development.
Integration is slow for economic as well as political reasons. Economically, 
MNCs have rather similar factor endowments and consequent comparative ad-
vantages both for industrial and agricultural products.42 Th is makes regional in-
tegration sensitive, as it exposes their industries to greater competition from each 
other in the short term. Combined with the limited absorption capacity of the 
MNCs and the proximity of the EU, this makes extra-regional trade more attrac-
tive than intra-regional trade and, consequently, hampers regional integration.43
In addition, scholars also believe that a certain level of ‘mutual’ trust between 
countries is needed in order to have regional cooperation and integration. Th is 
mutual trust has to be reached through political cooperation. However, this polit-
ical cooperation among MNCs has proven to be very diffi  cult. Th e MNCs clearly 
lack mutual understanding and trust in general to generate regional cooperation 
and integration. Particularly the Arab-Israeli confl ict prevents the establishment 
of a common front. Th e still tense relationship between Morocco and Algeria, 
poisoned by their decennia-old confl ict on the Sahara and the confl ict in Leba-
non are also barriers to a more united front among MNCs.44
3.4. Th e infl uence of other international players
Besides the problems discussed above, also the presence of other important 
international players and the challenges as well as chances for the European Med-
iterranean policy this implies has to be factored in. A fi rst important actor that 
has to be reckoned with is the United States. Th e US is a Mediterranean power 
thanks to its power on the world stage and its historical involvement in parts of 
the region, most notably in the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict. For the United States, 
the region is of less importance than for the EU. In contrast to the European 
42. SIA-EMFTA Consortium, p. 14
43. El-Rayyes, T., 2007, Th e Political Economy of Governance in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Go-
EuroMed Working Paper, available at http://www.go-euromed.org/documents/working_paper/WP0711_El_
Rayyes_Trade%20and%20Regional%20Integration%20between%20MPCs.pdf.
44. Escribao, T., 2000, Euro-Mediterranean versus Arab integration: Are they compatible? Conference Paper, 
available at: http://www.uned.es/deahe/doctorado/gescribano/apiart.pdf, p. 7.
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approach, therefore, US engagement with MNCs is bilateral or sub-regional (in-
stead of regional) and issue-area driven (instead of holistic). Th is means European 
interests are sometimes shared with the US, such as on security in general and 
weapons of mass destruction in particular, and thus its power to reach its objec-
tives on such issues reinforced. But in the meantime, the selective engagement 
of the US may distort its more holistic intentions, the stimulation of regional 
integration in particular. Also on the economic and trade front, the US has been 
active in the Mediterranean region. In 2000, the US concluded a free trade agree-
ment with Jordan, while in 2004, the US and Morocco signed an FTA. Th e US 
has planned a Middle East Free Trade Area by 2013.45
Another important player is the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC -Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates).46 Th ese coun-
tries have large fi nancial surpluses thanks to their oil exports. Traditionally, they 
invest these surpluses in industrialized countries (mostly the US and Europe) but 
increasingly, their FDI fl ows to the neighbouring Mediterranean, with concentra-
tion in the Mashreq. Th rough the GAFTA, the GCC countries are establishing 
a common market with the MNCs, again possibly interfering with the EMFTA. 
While it is diffi  cult to assess the impact of these trade policies of the US and the 
GCC on the EMFTA, such competitive liberalisation adds complexity to the 
creation of a regional free trade area because of, inter alia, competing rules of 
origin, technical, safety and health standards. Th is has already been witnessed in 
the problems the US-Morocco FTA caused for the implementation of the Aga-
dir Agreement. Th e ‘preference clause’ for agricultural products in this FTA that 
will aff ord US exporters of such products any better market access that Morocco 
gives other trading partners may also complicate EU-Morocco and regional trade 
integration in the future.
While Russia and China are not active on the trade policy front yet, their 
commercial and political presence is important for EU Mediterranean policy too. 
Russia is interested in the Mediterranean because of well-defi ned economic in-
terests, as well as because of broader strategic goals.47 Lastly, China is ever more 
present in the MNCs. North African countries have become major suppliers of 
raw materials and energy for hungry Chinese industries.48 Simultaneously, China 
has become a major supplier of, and investor in, MNCs. China is also an impor-
45. Th rough Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs), Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), com-
prehensive Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Bilateral FTAs with Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain, and Oman 
have already entered into eff ect. See http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/other-initiatives/middle-east-free-
trade-area-initiative-mefta.
46. Baabood, A., 2009, Th e Growing Economic Presence of Gulf Countries in the Mediterranean Region. In: 
Med.2009: Mediterranean Yearbook, pp. 203–209.
47. Makarychev, A.S., 2009, Russia in the Mediterranean Region: Resources of Infl uence. In: Med.2009: Medi-
terranean Yearbook, pp. 169–172.
48. Lafargue, F., 2008, China in North Africa. In: Med.2009: Mediterranean Yearbook, pp. 64–68.
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tant competitor of MNCs on the European market, for example, in textiles. All 
these initiatives and evolutions have to be reckoned with in European Mediter-
ranean economic policy.
4. Conclusion
Although there has been made signifi cant progress in the instalment of the 
EMFTA, like the opening of negotiations on agricultural products and services or 
the conclusion of the Agadir Agreement, a combination of factors has hampered 
the completion of an actual deep and comprehensive free trade area this year, as 
was foreseen in the Barcelona Declaration fi fteen years ago. First of all, the EU’s 
nature of being an internally confl icted and compartmentalized trade persona has 
hindered the EU of providing substantial incentives for MNCs, like free trade 
in agricultural products or free movement of persons. Second, as a consequence 
of this diffi  culty to provide incentives, the EU fails to convince some of its most 
important partners like Algeria or Syria of the benefi ts of the EMFTA. Most of 
the MNCs did not have a considerable amount of bargaining power to persuade 
the EU to comply with its promise of the establishment of a fully-fl edged FTA. 
Moreover, MNCs did not succeed in cooperating and integrating economically 
due to political divergences, but also because they have similar economic produc-
tion structures. Th erefore, the relations between the EU and the Mediterranean 
still can be best caracterized as a ‘hub-and-spoke’ relation instead of an inter-
regional partnership. Th is impedes the establishment of an EMFTA. In addition, 
the EU meets with competition from other international actors, like the US, Rus-
sia, China and the Gulf countries. Th eir economic interests in the region, and in 
case of the US and the GCC their own trade initiatives, interferes with the EU’s 
eff orts to create a free trade area with the Mediterranean.
However, our review also shows that there are attainable solutions for all of the 
identifi ed problems. First of all, liberalisation between the EU and MNCs can be 
enhanced by further negotiating trade-off s that are economically benefi cial and 
politically feasible both for the EU and MNCs. Agreement whereby the EU goes 
further in liberalising agriculture and mode 4 of trade in services in exchange 
for liberalisation of investment and further economic and administrative reform 
in line with the EU acquis on the side of MNCs should be possible. However, 
this seems to a large degree dependent upon fl anking and supporting measures 
within the EU and, supported by the EU, within the MNCs and necessitates a 
more equal and confi dent relationship between the EU and the MNCs. Second, 
to create the right context for such a true inter-regional partnership, two things 
should be done. On the one hand, the dependency relation between the EU and 
the Mediterranean has to be moderated by making changes in the institutional 
structure of the EMP. Th e Union for the Mediterranean provides an increase in 
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co-ownership of the partnership by the establishment of a co-presidency and the 
setting-up of a joint secretariat and a joint permanent committee. However, it 
will depend on the will of the political actors at both sides of the Mediterranean if 
these new institutions can increase ownership, and if it can stimulate cooperation 
among MNCs. On the other hand, among MNCs intra-regional trade should be 
enhanced and political cooperation and regional integration encouraged. Th e EU 
has to sustain its eff orts to fi nd a solution for the political problems in the region, 
like the dispute on the Western Sahara between Algeria and Morocco, but espe-
cially to help fi nd a solution for the confl ict between Israel and the Arab states. 
Without a defi nite settlement for the confl ict in the Middle East, regional inte-
gration and a fully-fl edged free trade area with Israel as a member is an illusion. 
Th ird, in addition, the EU should also sustain and strengthen its eff orts to address 
the remaining economic non-tariff  barriers towards inter-regional integration. 
Th e establishment of a system of Pan-Euro-Mediterranean cumulation of origin 
and the negotiation of ACAAs are steps in the right direction.
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